Leadership, Decision-Making and Governance in the EU and East Asia: Crisis and Post-Crisis

WORKSHOP REPORT

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Executive Summary

The EU Centre in Singapore, in association with the Centre for European Studies at Chulalongkorn University and the Chula Global Network, organised a workshop on Leadership, Decision-making and Governance in the EU and East Asia: Crisis and Post-crisis on 21-22 November 2011 at the Grand Park City Hall Hotel, Singapore. The workshop was convened in the context of the 2008 global financial crisis, which has hit both the EU and East Asia, albeit with different outcomes.

1. The global financial and sovereign debt crises in the European Union

Background

It has not been possible for the EU to have a 'perfect union' because of the disjuncture between its monetary and fiscal policy - monetary policy is assigned to the EU level, while fiscal and structural policies are left to national governments. The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) was created as a tool to enforce fiscal discipline, while the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines were forwarded to coordinate economic policy among the euro zone member states. However the threat of sanctions was not strong enough to force national governments to comply with these rules.

From an economic to a political crisis

The EU was relatively unprepared and the global financial crisis exposed the increasing imbalances in the EU which had been masked by years of economic growth. Tensions between member states were aired in public, between the debtor and creditor states, and between the stronger and weaker economies as the global financial crisis led to a fall in demand, that then revealed serious levels of government debt in several EU member states. As the breakup of the euro zone would have an impact beyond the financial markets, the EU is now facing a challenge to keep the euro zone together, balancing responsibility, solidarity and democracy.

The responses from Germany and France

Germany faces a conundrum on the issue of leadership of the EU – fears of German domination arise when it acts, but when it does not, there is the fear and disappointment of Germany's withdrawal from Europe. Germany is stuck in a 'no-win' situation.

In contrast, France, which historically has played an important leadership role, suffers from the general perception that its leadership in Europe seems to have 'significantly weakened' as of late. Nonetheless France's reputed distrust of unregulated markets and its resistance to globalisation have been vindicated with the global financial crisis.

While Germany might be economically stronger, it still needs French support for major European initiative. Hence, Paris and Berlin continue to consult each other regularly before making important policy decisions.

Crisis and response – implications for the EU

Some workshop participants believed that the EU has lost its gravitas as a result of the crisis and the problems in the euro zone. Others however felt that the talk about the decline of Europe is misguided, as France and the UK still wield the next greatest military power after the US, and in world trade, the EU is still very much a superpower.

The crisis has neither set a precedent for the disintegration of the EU nor has it curtailed its further enlargement.

2. The global financial crisis and East Asia

Lessons from the 1997-8 Asian financial crisis

The Asian financial crisis of 1997-8 provided the impetus for the region's economies to deepen their cooperation. Lessons were also learnt which prepared them for the current global financial crisis. Key examples of preventive action in East Asia were the development of regional bond markets and the creation of the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) - a pool of foreign-exchange reserves to fight currency speculation.

China's response to the global financial crisis

China has been caught between the desire to maintain strength through lying low, and the need to be seen as a responsible and benign member of the international community. Nevertheless China is now less reticent about getting involved in regional processes, and is also gaining weight in various global forums.

Regional leadership – Japanese style

With the rising importance of the G20 in the coordination of global monetary policy and governance, Japan has a less prominent role than it has had as part of the G8. Despite the rest of the region fast catching up to match Japan's development, it is still very much a regional and global economic power. Its ability to work effectively with China, and vice versa, and its relations with the US, are likely to affect the eventual outcome of regional initiatives and the exercise of Asian leadership globally.

South Korea's quest for a greater regional and global role

South Korea's weight in the international community has increased, and it has since taken on new regional and global roles. The regard many have for South Korea as a country that has mastered the current crisis relatively well should give it the opportunity to increase its regional and global profile. It has also been very aggressive in pursuing free trade agreements (FTAs) with its main trading partners

Crisis and response in East Asia

The global financial crisis prompted some developments in regional cooperation in finance and trade, such as the multilateralisation of the CMI and the creation of the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO). Yet the crisis has not really galvanised a concrete regional agenda for Asia. Perhaps because the region recovered rather quickly, the crisis did not elicit a clear regional response. ASEAN continues to dominate and drive most of the region's cooperative efforts.

East Asia's contribution to regional and global governance

Regional and global concerns are still secondary to national interests in the region. While the G20 provides a platform for Asia to exert its influence on the world stage, broader regional interests fail to be addressed. No Asian ideas on how the international monetary system and the financial markets can be reformed have been forthcoming. New poles of leadership from East Asia have not been much in evidence to the present time.

3. The future of global governance

Global governance today is marked by diminished multilateralism and 'forum shopping'. Few concrete global problems are being solved by institutions, where struggles over membership, representation, decision-making rules and normative orders dominate, resulting in only low-level cooperation. However shallow cooperation might be better than no engagement at all.

The global financial crisis serves as a wake-up call, revealing the necessity for a global mechanism to coordinate and regulate financial markets to prevent such a crisis from recurring, and moves must be made beyond trade liberalisation, toward rule-setting and norm-building.

Introduction

The global financial crisis that began in 2008 has shattered many ideas and beliefs regarding the international political economy, and regional and global governance. It is clear that boom and bust cycles have not disappeared, and that developed countries can be hit harder than emerging and developing markets.

Two regions where the effects of the global financial crisis have been felt strongly are the European Union (EU) and East Asia, because both are regions that are highly integrated into the global economy and are trade dependent. Concerted global efforts by all key economic players prevented a global depression and by 2010, economic growth has resumed in most parts of the world. However, while East Asia had been leading the charge in economic recovery globally, the EU was to be hit by the revelation of a huge sovereign debt in Greece.

So severe has the latter been that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has been called upon to help rescue Greece, Ireland and Portugal. Even the wisdom of one of the central pillars of the European project, 17 economies sharing a common currency, the euro, was questioned. This was perceived by some within the EU as another symptom of integration fatigue and the decline of the European social model.

In sharp contrast, East Asia appeared to emerge out of the crisis stronger, as several economies staged a sharp recovery in 2010. The recession was shorter and milder than in any other region, and economic growth resumed swiftly. However, the region also has to deal with the twin problems of being flush with liquidity because of funds moving from the low-growth economies in Europe to the faster growing Asian economies, and dealing with inflation too. Politically, tensions are also rising because of China's new assertiveness and the US looking to increase its interest in the region. At the same time, the fate of the East Asian economies are so intricately intertwined, as trade and investments flows within the region are compensating for the slower demand from the developed economies.

All these developments have profound implications for the future developments in regional and global governance. The looming public debt crisis in Europe and the US and the need to rebalance the global economy mean a post-crisis world that will undoubtedly look different. Already, the G20 has emerged and replaced the G8 as the key forum to discuss global economic issues and the international financial system as it comprises the world's most powerful economies.

Globally, the emergence of the G20 has given a pivotal position to China, Indonesia and South Korea, and perhaps also the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), on global economic governance for the first time. Europe continues to be prominently represented in the G20 with the EU, Germany, France, the UK, and Italy as full members. The crisis and the subsequent growth trajectory of East Asia gave most of its governments a sense of empowerment. Talk of shifts of power from West to East and the emergence of an 'Asian century', subdued during the late 1990s, resurfaced.

The developments within the EU and East Asia, as they come with the changes in the last few years raise several questions on the internal dynamics of each region, the responses taken by the leading economies and regional institutions in each region, and speculations on the future roles that the EU and East Asia might take in a post-crisis world.

Among them, a crucial one that has yet to be analysed and critically evaluated refers to the effects of the crisis on the behaviour of the different actors leading each region's respective processes of integration. This affects not only decision-making dynamics at the regional level, but also the roles that each region and different actors can play in global governance.

Session 1 – The Global Financial and Sovereign Debt Crises in the European Union

Background

To fully understand the financial and debt crisis in the euro zone, it is necessary first to consider the pre-crisis framework of governance of the single currency in the EU as established by the Treaty on European Union (otherwise known as the Maastricht Treaty). Prof Iain Begg is one of many interested observers who claim that it has not been possible for the EU to have a 'perfect union' because of the disjuncture between its monetary and fiscal policy - monetary policy is assigned to the EU level, while fiscal and structural policies are left to national governments. The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) was created as a tool to enforce fiscal discipline, while the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines were forwarded to coordinate economic policy among the euro zone member states. However the threat of fines and sanctions was not strong enough to force national governments to comply with these rules.

Crucially too, there is no treaty provision for a member state to leave the euro zone, although the Lisbon Treaty of 2009 did include a new provision for a member state to leave the EU completely – the only way therefore to exit the euro zone.

The crisis in the EU had its origins in the global recession in 2008 brought about by the collapse of Lehman Brothers in the United States. The banking crisis at this point hit European banks, some of which were recapitalised or nationalised. By mid-2009, this led to a sharp fall in GDP in some EU countries, while others like Poland and Germany saw strong growth and recovery respectively, resulting in imbalance within the EU.

In 2010, these macroeconomic imbalances erupted into the sovereign debt crises that engulfed Greece, Ireland and Portugal, which were subsequently bailed out by rescue packages. Underlying problems contributed largely to this rapid deterioration in the euro zone. Besides weak budgetary oversight under the SGP and the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines as mentioned above, a North-South cleavage compounded the imbalances within the Union – countries like Germany and Finland were exporting much more than Greece and the Iberian countries which saw increasingly large current account deficits.

From an economic to a political crisis

The EU is currently facing its most important crisis since the founding of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957, and its first major crisis since the creation of the euro. The EU was relatively unprepared and the crisis exposed the increasing imbalances in the EU which had been masked by years of economic growth. The EU's economic ascent halted, and unemployment began rising to unprecedented levels. With a lack of demand, manufacturing output slowed. An economic crisis has now also evolved into a political crisis. Tensions between member states were aired in public, between the debtor and creditor states, and between the stronger and weaker economies. The commitment to cooperation clearly did not extend to economic help and assistance. As the breakup of the euro zone would have an impact beyond the financial markets, the EU is now facing a challenge to balance responsibility, solidarity and democracy.

The sovereign debt crisis in the EU has its roots in the excessive levels of debt accumulated by several member states, due to a mix of factors, some due to overspending and fiscal mismanagement by governments such as Greece's, while others a result of housing bubbles fuelled by irresponsible financial engineering. This could be illustrated by the case of Ireland as presented by Dr Paul Gillespie.

He reminded the workshop that in the 1990s, Ireland was known as the 'Celtic Tiger' – a model for European modernisation and catch-up development posting spectacular growth rates. The establishment of the euro led to the growth of cheap credit that fuelled construction and domestic consumption in Ireland. That led to a property bubble that impacted state revenue as property-related taxes collapsed when the bubble burst. Ireland also has a large financial sector (a 10.6 per cent share of its economy) compared to the others in the euro zone (with an average of 5 per cent according to 2007 figures). Additionally, Ireland faced problems of being locked into the European credit and banking system, thereby denying its capacity to act unilaterally.

In 2008 a home-grown 'triple crisis' – a financial crisis caused by the collapse of the banking system; a fiscal crisis that was the result of a widening gap between current expenditure and revenues; and a competitiveness crisis that resulted from domestic cost structures – hit the country. With overexposure to property-based lending, bad lending practices, weak regulation and policing, Ireland suffered, accentuated by its status as a small economy open to globalisation. Then the Irish government made the fatal decision to introduce a blanket guarantee of the liabilities of the six main Irish banks, which eventually amounted to more than 40 per cent of GDP. Private debts morphed into public debts, and Ireland had no choice but to agree to an EU/IMF bailout which came on condition that various austerity measures have to be implemented.

The responses from Germany and France

Since the onset of the sovereign debt crises, financial and economic clout in the euro zone has shifted to Germany, a country shouldering the bulk of the rescue packages. Leadership from Germany is therefore necessary in the crisis, but as argued by Prof Kurt Huebner, it has so far not been forthcoming. But the country faces a conundrum on leadership issues – as Joschka Fischer, former Foreign Minister of Germany (1998-2005) once said, fears of German domination arise when it acts, but when it does not, there is the fear of Germany's withdrawal from Europe. Germany is stuck in a 'no-win' situation.

There has been anger over the lack of German action to deal with the crisis, but also fears of a 'Germanophied' Europe, where Europe is increasingly viewed as 'Germany's continent'. In reforming the euro zone, Germany is demanding more say in member state economies. As such, member states are wary of agreeing to the terms set by Germany on the financial architecture and fiscal discipline of the euro zone, as these debates encroach on issues of national sovereignty. Others have expressed anger over the 'inconsiderate' German strategy that is too ideological and driven by national concerns, 'while the rest of the EU, along with the euro falls overboard'. As it is the only state with the necessary financial power, it can either save the continent or be the cause of its demise. The increasingly hard-line stance it has taken towards Greece and the conditionalities it has tied to saving the euro are also leaving it increasingly isolated in Europe.

According to Prof Kurt Hübner, the German government initially tried to downplay the range and depth of the crisis. When they did accept the challenges posed by the crisis, they procrastinated on making important decisions. Inaction, and in particular its reluctance in helping Greece, created uncertainty that spooked the markets. In other words, German politicians have been 'unwilling to talk the language of financial markets'. And the reason for Germany's procrastination and lack of pro-activity could be found in its domestic political and economic context. The grand coalition government of Chancellor Angela Merkel, until 2009, was more interested in securing German economic interests by sticking to supply-side measures and to fiscal austerity.

Even after the change in the composition of the coalition government after the 2009 federal elections, there was no change in its handling of the crisis. It preferred to continue blaming the crisis on Greece's policy actions of the last 20 years. Essentially this is due to the nature of Germany as an export-oriented economy that is dependent on global growth. The global financial crisis of 2008, which threatened Germany's model of economic growth, had a hand in shaping German perceptions. Eventually when the market brought the euro zone to the brink of collapse, the German government started to shift its attitude on agreeing to a bailout package for Greece.

The role of France during the crisis was presented as a contrast to that of Germany. In their paper, Dr Reuben Wong and Dr Albrecht Sontag argued that in past decades, French figures like Robert Schuman, Jean Monnet and Jacques Delors have dominated the European integration project. However, there is the general perception that French leadership in Europe seems to have 'significantly weakened' as of late. However, the image of a country in decline and denial, out of touch with today's globalised world, is reproduced so often in the general Anglo-American media and even in scholarly discourse that is has become an ingrained stereotype.

Since the financial crisis of 2008 however, France's reputed distrust of unregulated markets and its resistance to globalisation have been vindicated. On the one hand, France has continued in its response to globalisation by opening its markets, a strategy evident for several decades now, aside from a brief attempt at nationalisation by the socialist President Mitterrand in the 1980s. On the other hand, the US and the UK have stepped up state intervention and government controls of the economy. This signals a narrowing the gap between French and Anglo-Saxon models of capitalism.

The EU may not be very adept at crisis management, and this is where France can play a concerted leadership role with Germany and the UK. Of course France has vested interests to act decisively on the sovereign debt crisis in Europe because of the significant exposure of French banks to Greek debt. The prospect of a Greek default would also affect France's credit rating. Unfortunately France's vision of rescue measures for the euro zone was not entirely compatible with Germany's. French leadership in Europe was increasingly put into question, especially with German economic dominance since the crisis broke out. Within the French-German relationship, German preferences prevail in a more dominant way than in the past so it remains to be seen if it is comfortable working as a junior partner to Germany.

Franco-German relations, in the EU context, have certainly changed since German reunification in 1989 and the eastward enlargement of the EU. But this does not mean that Germany has become the regional hegemon. While Germany might be economically stronger, it still needs French support and initiative. Paris and Berlin continue to consult each other before making important foreign policy decisions and joint initiatives, such as on disagreements arising from the euro zone crisis. France and Germany remain the key 'leadership duo' in all major decisions on the euro zone based on the size of their economies and their political and financial contributions to coordinated actions.

The latest reform brought forward at the time of this workshop was the 'six-pack', aimed at rectifying the lack of fiscal discipline among the euro zone member states and the imbalances between them. Also the euro zone agreed on a new crisis resolution mechanism – the European Stabilisation Mechanism – to replace the temporary European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). The burden now lies on the four remaining countries with AAA sovereign debt ratings, namely Germany, Luxembourg, Finland, and Netherlands to shore it up. There has been strong German support for the ESM, but this has come at a price - other member states giving up more sovereignty, and a new treaty enshrining budgetary discipline. However, as the largest beneficiary of the current system, it also has the biggest obligation to make it sustainable.

Crisis and response – implications for the EU

In the discussions that followed, debate focused on the lack of fiscal union as the primary reason for the current quagmire that the EU is in. Many observers point to the Treaty on European Union, and highlight the lack of an exit clause for the euro zone, adding that therefore countries should not be pressured to use the euro if their economic structures are not ready or suited for it.

What is sorely needed in the euro zone now is growth, and so far little has been devoted to pursuing this goal. Timing too is important in reaching a deal, so as to ensure credibility and effectiveness. While many countries are making structural adjustments to get themselves out of the crisis, reforms also take time.

Much political will rests behind monetary union in the EU. The criticism often heard is that it was driven too much by politics and not enough by economics, with the reality that there are too many diverse economies in the euro zone being propped up by subsidies and loans and many now question the viability and survivability of the euro.

A key difficulty in collective EU action to tackle the crisis is political-economic in nature, and is akin to a ransom game. Ordinary tax payers are asked to pay for the rescue of banks, which acted irresponsibly because of state guarantees borne by taxpayers in the first place. The European Central Bank (ECB) has had to step in because national governments did not act to control the crisis, but at the same time there are actors within the EU that do not want the ECB to accrue new powers. Though the influence of role the ECB played throughout the crisis was evident, the balance of power has invariably moved from supranational institutions back to member states.

Procrastination in political action is perhaps not the key problem, but rather it is that the basic issues of the international finance system have not been addressed. For Prof Reuben Wong, one should start to theorise from the perspective of international financial system, rather than to confine the discussion to the nitty-gritty of exchange rate mechanisms for instance. Since there is no agreement in assigning blame for the financial crisis, it makes sense to think in systemic terms – we are in a crisis of capitalism, or at least a particular form of free-reining capitalism.

Some participants in the workshop believed that the EU has lost its gravitas as a result of the crisis and the problems in the euro zone. The crisis has accelerated existing trends of shifts in power relations towards regions like the BRICs, East Asia and the Gulf states, and the increasing divergence among its member states limits the EU's ability to speak with a common voice and with this, its global role. At the regional level, power is being redistributed as well. Germany's position, as the main driver of EU's responses to the crisis, has been strengthened, while France's comparatively less sterling economic performance saw its relative economic position diminish. The UK, being out of the euro zone, has been sidelined and has had little say on the details of bail-out packages and the long-term fiscal policy of the euro zone.

With the crisis dragging on, the EU is increasingly seen as a model not to be followed. The European social model which has been the pride of many European nations is not so highly regarded any more, and in fact, many critics blame the generous welfare regimes and high levels of state spending for contributing to the sovereign debt crisis. The euro zone crisis also leaves the EU with less time and fewer resources for foreign policy, be it military resources, development aid or humanitarian assistance. Additionally, with a stagnating market, the EU's ability to rely on market-access related conditionality as an instrument of influence is considerably weakened. The EU is regarded as a middle power, and in many domains member states are beginning to act independently. We are beginning to see the formation of different 'Europes'. With no clear, centralised governance in the EU, taking on a leadership role on the global stage will prove difficult.

Others however felt that the talk about the decline of Europe is generally misguided, and much of the preservation of European power is due to France which, together with the UK, still wields the next greatest military power and force-projection after the US. In trade, the EU is still very much a superpower, in which 7 per cent of the world's population controls 25 per cent of world trade, despite its markedly diminished share of the world population since the 19th century.

The crisis has neither set a precedent for the disintegration of the EU nor has it not curtailed its enlargement. The EU has just signed an accession treaty with Croatia for it to become the 28th member state, while progress has been made for Serbia's and Montenegro's EU membership bids. In fact, as with the EU's previous crises, it has set the stage for deeper integration. On 13 December 2011, the euro zone leaders agreed to accelerate the entry of the ESM – the successor to the EFSF – to July 2012, while early-March 2012 has been set as the deadline for the signing of a 'fiscal compact' – an intergovernmental treaty between euro zone members to strengthen economic and monetary union, which is open to other member states.

On defaults as an option

There was intense exchange on what would happen if Greece should default. Some of the workshop participants felt that it might not be so catastrophic for countries with sovereign debts to default on their loans after all. Sovereign debt defaults occur all the time, including European countries like France which in fact defaulted on its loans no less than eight times before World War II. Defaults do not signal the ‘end of world’. The penalties for default are so minimal that it is a surprise why more countries have not defaulted.

Some countries like Argentina have actually seen growth in the aftermath of crisis, due in no small part to the backflow of funds from outside the country during crisis. Other examples include Iceland (in 2008-11) and Malaysia (in 1997-8) which are doing well economically since emerging from their respective crises, and despite not heeding international advice and ‘wisdom’. The case could be made that if Greece defaults on its loans, it could recover more quickly as it attains growth from competition rather than from austerity measures. Moreover, there is an estimated holding of €250 billion outside of Greece belonging to Greek citizens, similar to the Argentinean case of recovery.

Session 2 – The Global Financial Crisis and East Asia

Lessons from the 1997-8 Asian financial crisis

As Dr Natasha Hamilton-Hart explained, the global financial crisis has had the effect of intensifying the shift of global economic activity towards Asia. Asia has suffered comparably less than their American and European counterparts because financial markets in Asia have had minimal exposure to mortgage-backed financial derivatives that were the catalyst of the financial crisis in the United States. Lessons were also learnt from Asia's own crisis of the previous decade.

The financial crisis of 1997-8 provided the impetus for East Asian economies to deepen their cooperation. Being embedded in a global economy that was increasingly financially unstable, coupled with its dependence on extra-regional trade partners, East Asia began pursuing various regional governance arrangements, especially in financial cooperation. Dr Hamilton-Hart pointed out the existence of only one regional –wide dialogue that explicitly focused on financial and monetary issues and the lack of an ASEAN finance ministers meeting until 1997, explaining the unpreparedness to collectively deal with an issue of great collective importance to the region.

The ASEAN Plus Three (ASEAN+3) meetings, ASEM meetings and a bigger role played by the ADB have all provided new arenas for regional cooperation, and through such initiatives, mutual confidence has been built, and Asian countries are showing greater confidence in their own institutions and solidarity between nations.

The banking system and financial institutions are also not as fragile as they were during the Asian financial crisis. East Asian governments have also developed regional bond markets as alternative sources for raising liquidity so as to reduce their reliance on foreign funding, including the establishment of a US$700 million trust fund, backed primarily by China, Japan and South Korea. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) guarantees bonds denominated in regional currencies so as to stimulate the market for regional currency-denominated bonds. Dissatisfaction with global financial institutions led to the creation of the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) - a pool of foreign-exchange reserves to fight currency speculation by responding to short-term liquidity problems with bilateral currency swap arrangements – and a build up of regional foreign reserves after the 1997-8 Asian financial crisis.

As a result of above measures taken since the Asian financial crisis such as the development of regional financial facilities like the CMI, the subsequent decision to multilateralise it, and the development of regional bond markets, East Asia's dependence on foreign borrowing has declined. All these measures taken over the years after the onslaught of the Asian financial crisis have enabled the East Asian economies to weather the global financial crisis better.

If one takes the responses to the Asian financial crisis, regionalism in Asia since 1997 has not been diluted but rather has proliferated in its institutions, with ASEAN+3 as the new force in the regional agenda. On the other hand, the question remains as to how the performance of such a regional institution is to be assessed. Is it by the sheer number of regional institutions, even if they detract from the larger goal of a beneficial and functioning form of regionalism?

China's response to the global financial crisis

China has taken on a greater role in the IMF, and is also contributing financial resources to development banks, including the ADB. This greater role can also be seen through the internationalisation of the Chinese yuan, through renminbi-denominated bonds open to private investors. In East Asia, it also plays an important role in the multilateralisation of the Chiang Mai initiative (CMIM) which gives it an opportunity to contribute to the economic well-being of Asia. The rise of the BRICs also presents China with another channel to assert its financial influence, to narrow the global wealth gap and alleviate poverty, as they collectively hold US$4 trillion in reserves.

However, China still competes with these same emerging economies for trade, and with Japan for influence in the CMIM. Its position is also checked by the United States and the IMF, and it has been under pressure to revalue the yuan. Prof Gerald Chan noted, however, that Chinese leadership is unlikely to bow to external pressure, and noted the rise in populist nationalism. The initial fears that ASEAN countries had towards China's economic rise and the implications it would have on trade and investment have proven unfounded because of the mutual benefits of increasing economic integration.

Prof Gerald Chan further argued that China has been caught between the desire to maintain strength through its traditional style of lying low, and the need to be seen as a responsible and benign member of the international community. Because of this dilemma, China has perhaps been responsible for the global financial imbalance to a certain degree. Nevertheless China is now less reticent about getting involved in regional processes, as its initial fear of external influence in its internal affairs has dissipated with its increasing political-economic strength.

Regional leadership – Japanese style

After a decade of economic sluggishness and a global economic recession, Japan has to deal with 'becoming ordinary', according to Dr Julie Gilson. Although the Asia-Pacific region is an economic powerhouse and is home to 50 per cent of the global population, she noted that the once dominant Japan is struggling to accept the economic parity and potential overtaking by China and other emerging powers in this region. With the rising importance being placed on the G20 in the coordination of global monetary policy and governance, Japan has a less prominent role than it had as part of the G8. Domestically, Japan's governments have been unable to cut the country's deficit, and with rising agricultural subsidies, its economy has been described as a fiscal 'train wreck'.

Other socio-economic factors, such as those relating to an ageing population, and contentious domestic politics also impede Japan's attempts to regain influence internationally. Moreover, because of Japan's history and its difficult historical relations with the rest of Asia, there has been a lack of engagement with the rest of East Asia until very recently. As a result, agreements and regional cooperation are still limited mostly to loose coalitions that focus on specific issues.

Japan needs to manage dominant bilateral relations with major regional rivals and partners, namely, the United States and China, and at the same time encourage more region-wide community building. For Japan, assuming a leadership role in East Asia is proving difficult, where existing bilateral relationships dominate and prevent anything new from materializing. This includes the legacy of war, and Japan's dependence on the United States, and also Sino-Japanese rivalry. The Japanese government has embraced the proliferation of multilateral initiatives, while at the same time it has juggled its various engagements and alliances. It has to deal with the rising power of China, and in its regional engagement, it competes with China which prefers dealing with regional issues through ASEAN+3, while Japan favours the broader-based East Asia Summit.

According to Dr Gilson, there is a need for strong regional leadership in the face of the global economic crisis, and Japan's future is likely to depend on a complex mixture of multi-level solutions though questions remain over whether regional forums will encourage more cooperation or prove to be a destabilising force in the region by encouraging competition between nations. Despite the rest of the region fast catching up to match Japan's development, it is still very much a regional and global economic power. Its ability to work effectively with China is likely to affect the eventual outcome of regional initiatives and Asian leadership globally.

During the discussion, some participants asked how the Japanese government is able to be so proactive in pushing for the country's participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), given the 'domestic constraints' typically presented by Japan's bureaucracy. It would seem that the Japanese prime minister has now more autonomy from Japan's bureaucracy for him to act more freely in the foreign policy arena. For Dr Gilson, much of this has to do in part with the new found enthusiasm of the US in Asia


Sung-hoon PARK
John RAVENHILL
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Reuben WONG
Gerald CHAN
Leadership and Governance in a Post-Crisis Landscape – the EU and East Asia
Paul GILLESPIE
John RAVENHILL
Richard HIGGOTT
Werner PASCHA

Back row: Prof Dr Jürgen Rüland, Prof John Ravenhill, Dr Petr Blizkovsky, Prof Dr Werner Pascha, Prof Heribert Dieter, Dr Peng Dajin, Assoc Prof Charit Tingsabadh, Prof Iain Begg, Prof Sung-hoon Park, Prof Charles Elworthy, Prof Dr Kurt Hübner.

Front row: Assoc Prof Suthipand Chirathivat, Dr Julie Gilson, Dr Jikon Lai, Ms Hong Wai Mun Jasmine, Ms Anne Pollet-Fort, Dr Paul Gillespie, Dr Ramon Pacheo-Pardo, Prof Richard Higgott, Dr Yeo Lay Hwee, Dr Natasha Hamilton-Hart, Dr Gerald Chan, Asst Prof Reuben Wong, Mr Timothy Leon Misir, Mr Loke Hoe-Yeong.

since the Obama administration took office. Hence this became an opportunity for Japan to respond in kind to the US's overtures.

South Korea's quest for a greater regional and global role

South Korea is the 10th largest trading nation and the 15th largest economy in the world. Like other Asian economies, lessons learnt from the 1997 Asian financial crisis enabled South Korea to stage a quick recovery, emerging from the crisis even more competitive than before. In a region where cooperation is not coherent, and where there are leadership competitions in Asian regional architecture – between China and Japan, and between Korea and ASEAN, the role that South Korea and Asia can play in providing any form of global leadership may be limited.

Still, South Korea is aspiring to take on a leadership role amidst the increasing regionalism activities in Northeast Asia, and has been trying to bridge the interests of the two major powers, China and Japan, by establishing the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat in September 2011. It has also taken on the role of mediator between the developing and developed parts of East Asia, pursuing the Asian Bond Market Initiative, and the 2007 initiative of establishing the Regional Settlement Intermediary to improve post-trade infrastructure for clearing and settling transactions.

According to Prof Park Sunghoon, South Korea is one of the 'most prominent beneficiaries' of the global financial crisis. South Korea's weight in the international community has increased, and it has since taken on new regional and global roles. Its domestic recovery measures to stabilise its banking sector and improve its economy have been very successful, and have led to an upgrading of its credit rating by Fitch. Developments in East Asian regional architecture and the introduction of many new and different instruments for regional cooperation, and the regard many have for South Korea as a country that has mastered the current crisis relatively well should give it the opportunity to increase its regional and global profile, especially in addressing regional and global development challenges and strengthening crisis prevention mechanism.

South Korea is providing leadership in addressing developmental challenges through country-specific projects under its Knowledge Sharing Program. The main recipients of this aid programme are the developing countries in Asia. This programme, focusing on building trade and industrial capacity has been coloured by South Korea's own historical experience. South Korea has also been very aggressive in pursuing free trade agreements with its main trading partners since the first FTA concluded with Chile in 2003. However, few of these have been with countries in the region, and if South Korea wants to raise its regional profile, deeper dialogue within the region is necessary. In this regard, South Korea has been actively participating in East Asia's efforts to strengthen the CMI through its multilateralisation – South Korea's share in the CMIM is 16 per cent, while Japan's and China's are 32 per cent each, and ASEAN's is 20 per cent. Prof Sunghoon Park opined that by accepting the lowest share in the CMIM, South Korea indicated its readiness to sacrifice national interests for achieving more important regional goals.

Questions are being asked about how South Korea can maintain and improve its role as well as increase its weight in the regional cooperation agenda. Prof Park added that South Korea has also provided leadership in warning the international community not to resort to protectionism. The international community has also accepted a variety of issues raised and initiated by South Korea as part of the G20s official agenda (the so-called 'Korea initiative'), and its green-growth strategy.

South Korea has been distinctly more proactive than Japan in pursuing regional integration. Does this suggest signs of competitive regionalism, or is there a transition towards a system that is still being worked out? Some would rather characterise South Korea's role in Asian regional integration as that of a mediator, with ASEAN in the driver's seat.

Questions were also raised on Korea's potential participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The US may pose some of the usual constraints for South Korean policy making, but it is increasingly China's posture that has a greater impact on South Korea's consideration of participating in the TPP, since China is South Korea's largest export destination. In any case, South Korea already has an FTA with the US that has been ratified and implemented.

Crisis and response in East Asia

The global financial crisis prompted some developments in regional cooperation in finance and trade. The ASEAN+3 nations agreed to multilateralise the CMI to provide increased liquidity for the region in times of crisis, and the establishment of a surveillance unit based in Singapore – the ASEAN Plus Three Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO). However, as Dr Hamilton-Hart pointed out, economic cooperation in Asia extends beyond economic concerns and is often strategically and politically motivated. Though the perception is that the centre of global economic activity is moving to this region, the promotion of deeper and region-wide cooperation has been difficult because of political disputes among the larger and aspiring powers and because of the different coalitions dividing the Northeast Asian countries. She also added that despite the proliferation of regional initiatives, monetary cooperation is still at a preliminary stage. Furthermore, East Asia is at risk of an outflow of capital from their markets and huge decline in exports if demand slows in their primary markets of the US and Europe. The importance of extra-regional markets to this part of the world cannot be understated and a double-dip recession or a second credit crunch, scenarios that could quite possibly occur, will certainly change perceptions again as Asia will certainly not be spared the consequences.

The global financial crisis has not really galvanised a regional agenda for Asia. Because the region was not affected as severely as compared to the West and recovered rather quickly, it did not elicit a clear regional response in Asia, unlike the crisis ten years earlier which led to initiatives for regional cooperation on financial and monetary issues in East Asia and the development of regional financial facilities. There is no distinctly Asian agenda, and at the moment, many diffuse, cross-cutting agreements and non-binding standard-setting efforts form the basis for regional cooperation. Furthermore, there seems to be less appetite for integration in Asia after the events in Europe.

There has been little progress in forming a more ambitious regional agenda because of the lack of demand for it in a region of diverging strategies and interests. Many overlapping and redundant regional forums exist and cooperation is still very much achieved through inter-governmental cooperation. On the trade front for instance, there has been a proliferation of FTAs in the region. It is clear that bilateralism, rather than multilateral governance is the preferred form of engagement in East Asia.

ASEAN has dominated most of these cooperative efforts, to the extent that it has had a limiting effect on further development in regional cooperation and governance. Its consensus-seeking culture eschews formal, binding commitments and prioritises non-interference and state sovereignty. Furthermore, key actors necessary to address specific issues in the region are not present in ASEAN.

East Asia's contribution to regional and global governance

Globally, questions remain over how to restore and find new sources of economic growth, and for appropriate global economic and financial governance. The G20 is emerging as the premier economic forum for global cooperation, and as such, its Asian members are assuming a stronger international role. Already, South Korea has hosted the 5th G20 meeting in 2010, joined the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD, and in 2011, hosted the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, which focuses on global efforts on poverty reduction and promoting economic growth.

These developments, however, do not hide the fact that Asia still does not speak with a coherent voice. Regional and global concerns are still secondary to national interests in the region. While the G20 provides a platform for Asia to exert its influence on the world stage, broader regional interests fail to be addressed because of conflicting interests, and a lack of coordinated positions among Asian countries continue to hamper collective action and are affecting Asia's weight at the global level.

The ongoing global financial crisis is also changing Asia's attitude towards its participation in regional and global institutions. South Korea, Japan, China, and ASEAN's share quotas and voting power have all increased in the IMF. However, despite its increasing international stature, China's regional influence is felt more than its global presence. It plays a more important role in the CMIM than it does in the G20 where it takes a backseat to more developed nations, or the IMF, whose structure inherently favours the West.

There has been no push for reform of the international monetary system from East Asia, especially since it will be destabilising on China's economy. Although this is slowly changing, it is reflective of its underlying economic structure, which is heavily integrated into global system, and whose demands are dominated by markets outside the region. Since the global financial crisis in 2008, small steps have been taken in financial cooperation, for example, the aforementioned CMI has grown to US$120 billion, and the decision to multilateralize the swaps in 2009 was 'a significant and concrete post-crisis step towards greater cooperation' in Dr Hamilton-Hart's opinion. Monetary cooperation though, is still very preliminary, with little official initiatives for cooperation currently on the agenda.

Looking at the rise of the various ASEAN groupings, there were discussions over the effectiveness of the 'ASEAN Way' that subscribes to a doctrine of non-interference, the use of consultation and building consensus, and the mutual respect for sovereignty. This has often resulted in decisions at the lowest common denominator, and little progress in areas such as human rights abuses. Questions were raised as to whether the establishment of AMRO is a step towards the creation of an Asian Monetary Fund. The answer to this will depend on reforms of the IMF.

Some participants wondered if regionalism may be in decline in Asia as Asian countries gain stature in international forums. Similarly in the EU, there appears to be 'regional disintegration' after the onset of the financial crisis, whereby the door is open to a bigger role for external players like the IMF, China or even Russia through their contributions to bailout packages and purchases of bonds.

The crisis shows that East Asia has not decoupled from developed markets and that the region remains embedded in a global economy and is dependent on extra-regional trade partners. According to Dr Hamilton-Hart, East Asia is 'in the best position they have ever been in to exercise a greater degree of voice in global multilateral institutions and global crisis management and prevention efforts', but is lacking in leadership, whether individually or collectively, as the region continues to endorse the old Washington consensus. No Asian ideas on how the international monetary system can be reformed, and no alternative sets of ideas in Asia as to how financial markets should be regulated have been forthcoming.

Session 3 – The Future of Global Governance

As a result of major crises and financial shocks, sentiments of entitlement due to exclusive and discriminatory international institutions, and extra- and intra-regional power shifts, there has been increasing pressure for reform of global international institutions. According to Prof John Ravenhill and Dr Jikon Lai, the IMF has been going through changing fortunes in recent years, and the TPP and the G20 are reorganising regional and global economic governance with their growing international clout. Unilateralism seems to have prevailed because of the impasse constantly encountered when attempting to coordinate efforts on a global scale. Other participants lamented that multilateralism needs to be rescued, as aspects such as trust building are being lost.

One glaring thing in common between the crises of the last 20 years such as the ones in Thailand, South Korea, Russia, Argentina, and the more recent crises since 2008, is that they all relate to the financial market and its particular, intrinsic mechanisms. This highlights the inability of governments to effectively supervise the machinery of global finance. On the one hand, daily swings in the financial markets are the norm, which precludes the logic of 'financial stability'. On the other hand, financial stability can be seen as a public good, but not one that can be provided for by markets. The problem, of course, is that regulators and leaders are only desired by the markets when there is a mess. A participant suggested that more progress towards stability could be made by regional organisations if the focus moved away from trade liberalisation towards rule-building and norm-setting.

In his presentation, Prof Jürgen Rüland argued that global institutions and international regimes are undergoing profound changes due to the emergence of an increasingly vertically and horizontally differentiated multi-layered system of global governance in a period marked by the absence of a dominant hegemon and the power rivalry amongst many competing powers and actors. This has been accompanied by institutional hedging and 'forum shopping' by both East Asian and European nations. In an environment of power asymmetries, the tendency toward institutional hedging via 'forum shopping' is undermining regional and global cooperation because of a loss of cooperative substance in multilateral institutions.

Prof Rüland asserted that in the current global political economy, short-term and low-intensity cooperation, a phenomenon he terms 'diminished multilateralism' and institutional hedging is on the ascent. Institutions are becoming the arenas where these power struggles are played out. In this environment, what can be witnessed is a move away from the institutional optimism that was prevalent in the post-Cold War period, where principled multilateralism based on a liberal cosmopolitan order and faith on multilateral institutions was the norm.

Instead, global governance today is marked by diminished multilateralism. In these contexts, few concrete global problems are being solved by institutions, where struggles over membership, representation, decision-making rules and normative orders dominate, resulting in only low-level cooperation. Such institutions are often informal, broad-based and short-lived. Emergent global and regional powers, a few of which are from East Asia, have become sceptical of Western notions of multilateralism driving the revision of the institutional status quo. Double standards in the application of the West's own cosmopolitan norms in the fields of democracy and human rights as well as the aloof responses and conditional measures imposed on Asian nations following the 1997 Asian financial crisis by Western-led international institutions only served to entrench this belief that the institutions effectively functioned as vehicles of Western power projection.

Critics of shallow institutions focus on their high costs, because they do not come up with the solutions to common problems. However, shallow cooperation might be better than no engagement at all, especially at a time when unilateral action is becoming more common. It could also be seen as a precursor to deeper cooperation, and participants agreed that institutional politics, which could also be paralysing, is better than military politics between states. The trend of institutional hedging and forum shopping does not need to be seen negatively. The increased competition between forums in Asia might possibly lead to niches carved out for each grouping, and the increase in the diversity of voices should be seen as a good thing, especially in planning global governance.

While the EU appears as a successful regional player when one looks around the world, its potential to take a lead in global governance is hampered by the region's financial woes, and an economic situation that does not seem like it will be resolved soon. This was a sentiment shared by many, and in the discussion it was suggested that it is not because the EU is not an attractive model, but rather, that other countries do not share its priorities and concerns. For example, the EU is often hailed as a leader in the environmental policy, but the EU's work on climate change, while coherent, does not have a great following. Others suggested that one should have more realistic expectations of the EU when it comes to its role on the global stage, as the criticisms that arose were due to incorrect assumptions about the EU – the way it is structured is unlike that of traditional powers, where clear leadership and military power are required.

This brought the discussion to what or who exactly, is leading global governance, as despite the much touted shift in geopolitical power from the West to East, East Asia seems to be either unable or reluctant to pull its weight on the global stage. It was remarked that since the ASEAN+3 grouping is failing to take the lead in regional governance, it has resulted in the lack of a coherent East Asian voice and thus cannot be expected to take the lead in global governance. Others questioned if a coherent East Asian voice is even necessary, as it is not a homogenous region, let alone a suitable representative for the rest of Asia. Observers are conscious that India, an emergent economic power often cited in the same breath as China, is not fully involved in the region. This is evident in the way East Asia integration has developed over the years without any engagement with India. Because of its own security dynamics and historical ties, East Asia is unlikely to be as important to India, especially when compared to the United States.

New actors are beginning to shake up the old hierarchy. The growing influence of emerging economies, with the concurrent weakening of Europe and the United States, has resulted in their growing clout in international institutions like the IMF and G20. But if regional institutions only serve to counterbalance global institutions then the bigger picture is lost, and the consequence is little progress in settling regional or global problems. The crisis has revealed the urgency of multilateral global financial governance, but this should complement, rather than replace or substitute for national regulation of finance. While the term 'global governance', as some have commented, is a flaky concept, talks surrounding it should continue, as problems of a global scale cannot be left to national governments. However, for global governance to work, it needs multilateral and multi-tiered levels to address the complexities currently faced in the current political economy.

Panel Discussion on Leadership and Governance in a Post-Crisis Landscape
The EU and East Asia
Public Session

Panellists:

Dr Petr Blizkovsky / Prof Ramkishen Rajan / Prof Richard Higgott / Dr Paul Gillespie / Dr Peng Dajin

The last session of the workshop was a panel discussion open to the public, on Leadership and Governance in a Post-Crisis Landscape. The two-hour session was chaired by Dr Yeo Lay Hwee. The panellists spoke for about 15-20 minutes each, followed by a question and answer session with the audience.

Report[1]

Mr Petr Blizkovsky (EU Fellow, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy) focused on the European reaction to the debt crisis and its implications, and the role the EU can play in a global institutional framework. The EU, with its system of voluntary shared sovereignty, faces implementation problems, due to insufficient coordination. He explained the architecture of economic governance in the EU (the legislative measures to ensure discipline, and the political instruments used – namely the Lisbon Strategy and the Euro Pact Plus/Euro 2020), macro-economic coordination in the eurozone and its changes over the years, and the deficiencies in the operation of the system that have contributed to the crisis. He also spoke about the new areas of governance and new facilities such as the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF).

For him, the crisis is an alarm signal indicating that stronger economic coordination is necessary. To overcome the crisis, policies agreed upon must be swiftly implemented. Once the political will is there, the EU will emerge out of the crisis stronger with deeper political integration.

Prof Ramkishen Rajan (George Mason University) focused on the impact of the crisis in Asia in the short- and long-term. He covered in great detail the economic impact of the eurozone crisis on Asia, and compared the economic/fiscal arrangements in Asia and the EU. He revisited the Asian financial crisis of 1997-8 to examine how Asia recovered, how it has learnt from that episode and how this is helping the region weather the current crisis better.

On the EU, he discussed the current account deficits in crisis countries, the external liabilities in foreign denominations, fixed exchange rates, appreciating exchange rates, loss of economic competitiveness, regional contagion, the Troika's (EU, ECB and the IMF) rescue packages and austerity measures, and how they are affecting citizens and member states. On Asia, Prof Rajan explained that its current account deficit had been caused by falling investment, whereas in the EU, there is the phenomenon of falling savings as well as falling investment. The 1997-8 crisis was more in the private sector, while the ongoing crisis in EU is one of sovereign debt. The eurozone countries cannot exercise currency depreciation to regain relative competitiveness, whereas this move helped Asia get back to capital account surpluses following its 1997-8 crisis. Instead, in the eurozone, member states have to resort to wage deflation. Lastly, the external environment should not be overlooked – the Asian financial crisis struck when the US economy was doing well.

While Asia is currently experiencing growth, if and when there is a recapitalisation in Europe, money will flow out of Asia, affecting overall market liquidity and business confidence, as the regions' exports and investment are closely intertwined. In conclusion, Asia is better prepared from a structural perspective due to its experience during the 1997-8 crisis – it now has a highly disciplined fiscal policy.

Prof Richard Higgott (Murdoch University) focused on the socio-economic changes and politics in a heavily financialised environment that is dominated by capital and structured around capital flows. This has resulted

[1] This was previously published on the EU Centre's website on as an event report (28 November 2011).

in the overemphasis on development of the global economy and the relative underdevelopment of the global polity. The role of multilateral institutions and the principles and practices of international relations that have emerged in the second half of the 20th century are now being challenged. The power of market ideology – as the driver of how we govern ourselves and how we manage economic processes – is being questioned.

Two major questions face policy-makers today – how should they respond to market failure? What happened to institutions? The development of global institutions has not accompanied deregulation, the privatisation of state assets, the increased securitisation of public life and goods. In addition to the emergence of the technocratic, managerial class, there are currently deep insecurities sensed among the established powers, which have yet to forge a new equilibrium after a period of bipolarity during the Cold War. But how do they work their relations out in the new world order? The G20 summits are hailed as crisis-busters, but not seen as a good manager of the global economy over a sustained period.

Dr Paul Gillespie (University College Dublin) gave the background on Ireland and the effects of the crisis in the country, highlighting the disconnect between the political-economic elite and wider public. Bottom-up politics and citizens' participation are necessary, most important with regard to the deeper integration of the European Union. There is a need for a creation of a common sphere of politics at the Irish and European level which involves the citizenry as well as elites.

Prof Peng Dajin (University of South Florida) offered his interpretation of China's perception of the current crisis, emphasising the reversal of fortunes in how China is now in the position as the rescuer of the US and Europe, after having been dictated to in previous times. He was also of the opinion that China has unambiguously emerged as the regional power, having eclipsed Japan in the economic sphere. He suggested that Chinese policy makers are pragmatic and would do what they see as in the interests of the Chinese to 'help' Europe recover.

List of Abbreviations

ADB	Asian Development Bank
AMRO	ASEAN Plus Three Macroeconomic Research Office
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEAN+3	ASEAN Plus Three
BRIC	The countries of Brazil, Russia, India and China
CMI	Chiang Mai Initiative
CMIM	Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation
ECB	European Central Bank
EEC	European Economic Community
EFSF	European Financial Stability Facility
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
ESM	European Stability Mechanism
EU	European Union
FTA	Free trade agreement
IMF	International Monetary Fund
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
SGP	Stability and Growth Pact
TPP	Trans-Pacific Partnership

Workshop Programme

DAY 1 - 21 November 2011 (Monday)

Session 1: Leadership and Decision Making in the EU
Moderator: Dr Yeo Lay Hwee, EU Centre in Singapore

Prof Iain Begg, London School of Economics & Political Science
EU's Response to the Global Financial Crisis and Sovereign Debt Crisis – Economic Governance Under Stress?
Dr Paul Gillespie, University College Dublin
At the Receiving End – Irish perspectives on the EU's Financial Rescue Packages and EU Decision-Making Structure
Prof Kurt Hübner, University of British Columbia
Germany's Response to the Financial and Debt Crisis and its Regional role and Leadership in the EU
Dr Reuben Wong, National University of Singapore
The French Response to the Financial and Debt Crisis and its Regional Role and Leadership in the EU
Dr Heribert Dieter, German Institute for International and Security Affairs
Discussant

Open Discussion

Session 2: Leadership and Decision Making in East Asia
Moderator: Prof Werner Pascha, University of Duisburg-Essen

Dr Natasha Hamilton-Hart, University of Auckland
The Responses from Regional Institutions (ASEAN and ASEAN + 3 EAS) to the Global Financial Crisis and Perspectives
Prof Gerald Chan, University of Auckland
China's Response to the Global Financial Crisis and its Regional Role in East Asia
Dr Julie Gilson, University of Birmingham
Japan's Response to the Global Financial Crisis and its Regional Role in East Asia
Prof Park Sunghoon, Korea University
Korea's Response to the Global Financial Crisis and its Regional Role in East Asia
Prof Suthiphand Chirathivat, Chula Global Network, Chulalongkorn University
Discussant

Open Discussion

DAY 2 - 22 November 2011 (Tuesday)

Session 3: The EU and East Asia in Global Governance
Moderator: Prof Charit Tingsabadh, Centre for European Studies, Chulalongkorn University

Prof Jürgen Rüland, University of Freiburg
Forum Shopping and Forum Selection – Impact on Regional & Global Governance in Crisis and Post-Crisis Landscape
Prof John Ravenhill & Dr Jikon Lai, Australian National University
Asia's Multi-level Response to the Global Financial Crisis and the Post-Crisis Landscape
Prof Charles Elworthy, Chulalongkorn University
A Diminished Role of EU in Global Governance in the Post-Crisis Landscape?
Dr Ramon Pacheo-Pardo, King's College London
Discussant

Open Discussion

Public Session "Panel Discussion on Leadership and Governance in a Post-Crisis Landscape – the EU and East Asia"

Moderator: Dr Yeo Lay Hwee

Panellists
Dr Petr Blizkovsky, General Secretariat of the Council of the EU
Prof Ramkishen Rajan, George Mason University
Prof Richard Higgott, Murdoch University
Dr Paul Gillespie, University College Dublin
Dr Peng Dajin, University of South Florida

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   EU Fellow, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore

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